Among methods of breaking a cipher, exhaustive key search stands out as the most successful (albeit the least efficient) method. We demonstrate that various algorithmic implementations of exhaustive key search are not equally effective, and cryptosystems can be devised which make some implementations of exhaustive key search unsuccessful (in the sense that the problem these algorithms try to solve turns out to be incomputable). We observe that there are implementations of exhaustive key search that are always successful (i.e. they terminate and generate a correct result irrespective of the cryptosystem they are used against). As to those implementations of exhaustive key search that are not always successful, we describe them and those cryptosystems that can make them unsuccessful.
INTRODUCTION
The informal concept of 'unbreakable' encryption can be formalized in different ways; see, e.g. the review paper [1] . Historically the first formalization is Shannon's informationtheoretic approach, according to which encryption is unbreakable if knowing the encrypted message does not reduce, from the attacker's point of view, the entropy of the open message; an example of such an unbreakable system is a one-time pad. Nowadays, other formalizations have been introduced, of which the most notable is the model of limited memory available to the attacker, developed in [2, 3, 4, 5] .
In cryptography, it is important to distinguish between intractable problems, on the one hand, and incomputable (also known as undecidable or unsolvable) problems, on the other hand. A problem is called intractable if no efficient algorithm for solving it is known; however, there are some (inefficient) algorithms for solving the problem. Therefore, an intractable problem can be solved if one has a fast computer and enough time, or if one invents a better algorithm. All modern commercially used cryptosystems are based on intractable problems, that is, the problem of breaking such a cryptosystem is intractable. Therefore, these cryptosystems are not unconditionally unbreakable, but they are unbreakable as long as the attackers do not have sufficiently fast computers or cannot invent efficient algorithms for breaking the cryptosystems.
A problem is called incomputable if no algorithm for solving the problem exists at all. From time to time, an idea arises whether it is not possible to understand 'unbreakable' encryption in the sense that the problem of breaking such a cryptosystem is incomputable. Indeed, one might argue that if, for example, the RSA encryption is based on an intractable number theory problem, then why cannot one develop a cryptosystem based on Hilbert's tenth problem? Such a cryptosystem would be, one might argue, even better, because it would be based on an incomputable number theory problem. In this paper, we concentrate on one possible formalization of what 'breaking a cryptosystem' can mean, and show that, in this particular sense, the problem of breaking a cryptosystem cannot be made incomputable. Having made this observation, we apply some finer analysis and find out exactly what sort of attacks become unsuccessful when incomputability is used in the design of a cryptosystem.
Our methodology is the following. Against any particular cryptosystem, a variety of attacks can be carried out. If a cryptosystem is 'unbreakable', it should resist all of them. This is why in this paper we concentrate on only one type of attack against a cryptosystem-exhaustive key search, which is the slowest but the most thorough attack. If the problem of breaking a cryptosystem is incomputable, we would expect to see that none of the attack algorithms will terminate successfully, and, in particular, none of the key search algorithms will be successful. Therefore, what we shall study is whether any of the key search algorithms are always successful or not.
The results of this paper are interesting for two reasons. On the one hand, asymptotic results concerning computability create an important theoretical framework within which applied research can develop in the right directions. For example, Turing's result on the incomputability of the halting problem (see e.g. [6] ) and Cohen's result on the incomputability of the problem of detecting a computer virus (see e.g. [7] ) have influenced further research in these areas, On the other hand, when representatives of the business community are presented with an encryption program based on 'incomputability', they might be tempted by it. Indeed, incomputability is a property which will be true for all times; therefore, if a cryptosystem is based on incomputability, then they can invest in the security system only once and will not need to update and maintain it regularly (as is necessary in all really secure systems). This would be a dangerous illusion, and this is another reason why it is important to demonstrate that using incomputability in the design of a cryptosystem does not necessarily make the cryptosystem unbreakable. 1 
DEFINITIONS AND A PESSIMISTIC RESULT
To ensure confidentiality of communication, the sender (usually known as Alice) encrypts her message (an unencrypted message is called an open message), sends the encrypted message to the receiver (usually called Bob), who decrypts it and obtains the open message. To do this, Alice uses a set of encryption rules and Bob uses a set of decryption rules, which together are called a cryptosystem. In practice, every cryptosystem has a variable parameter, called a key, which is a secret piece of information known only to Alice and Bob. 2 It is generally accepted that the cryptosystem cannot, and even should not be secret (this is so-called Kerckhoff's principle, e.g. [8, p. 23] ), so the only secret element of communication is the key. Suppose an eavesdropper, Eve, obtains an encrypted message and wants to decrypt it without knowing the key. 3 She can use exhaustive key search, i.e. she can browse through all keys of the cryptosystem, until the right one is found.
From the algorithmic point of view, we can think of a cryptosystem in the following way. A cryptosystem consists of a pair of algorithms ε, δ and three sets of finite sequences of bits O, E, K (we shall assume that K is recursively 1 Let us give one real-life example. A software company 'Crypto.Com, Inc.' wrote on their web site that they have invented an encryption algorithm which 'is safe from being decrypted using existing mathematical decoding procedures . . . and high power supercomputer based algorithmic procedures'. This encryption is based 'on mathematical theorems . . . that showed that certain classes of problems were mathematically and algorithmically unsolvable'. Unfortunately, the company did not disclose details of their cryptosystem, but it is clear that they expected the visitors of their web site to agree, on the intuitive level, that being 'unbreakable' follows naturally from being 'incomputable'. Now the company has been purchased by another company, and their web site does not exist anymore, but some critical discussion can still be found on the web page (having, by coincidence, the same name as the company) http://www.crypto.com/cryptocom.html.enumerable). The algorithm ε is an encryption algorithm; its inputs are an open message o ∈ O and a key k ∈ K, and its output is an encrypted message e ∈ E. The algorithm δ is a decryption algorithm; its inputs are an encrypted message e ∈ E and a key k ∈ K, and its output is an open message o ∈ O. The only requirement on ε and δ is that for
As to Eve, we shall assume that she knows an encrypted message e and what cryptosystem is used; in particular, she knows the decryption algorithm δ and the set of keys K. To organize a key search, she writes an algorithm σ = σ (e) which uses the algorithm δ as its external subroutine and calls δ(e, k) for various k ∈ K. We shall call the algorithm σ a key search algorithm. 
Definition 2.2. Let (ε, δ, O, E, K) be a cryptosystem. Let σ be a key search algorithm. We shall say that σ (e) conducts exhaustive key search if it checks all keys.
Eve's key search algorithm σ repeatedly calls the decryption algorithm δ, which is designed by Alice and Bob. The idea verified in this paper is whether Alice and Bob can design a decryption algorithm δ which is extremely awkward for Eve to execute and such that Eve cannot rectify this awkwardness by a careful choice of σ . Namely, speaking in formal terms, we want to consider the case of δ being incomputable. Indeed, suppose that there is k ∈ K such that for all e ∈ E the algorithm δ(e, k) does not terminate. Whatever algorithm σ Eve chooses, it checks keys in some specific order k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n , k n+1 , . . . . If for some key k n ∈ K the algorithm δ(e, k n ) does not terminate, then the execution of σ will be stuck in this δ(e, k n ) forever and will never proceed to k n+1 and the rest of the keys. In this situation, the exhaustive key search is impossible, because none of the key search algorithms conducts exhaustive key search.
Suppose we consider a cryptosystem (ε, δ, O, E, K) such that δ(e, k) either terminates or does not terminate, depending on the values of e and k. In such a cryptosystem, each key k has exactly one of the following two properties: either for every e ∈ E the algorithm δ(e, k) terminates, or for some e ∈ E the algorithm δ(e, k) does not terminate. Let us call the key k valid in the former case or invalid in the latter case. Bob needs to execute the decryption algorithm δ (e, k) Proof. Let k 1 , k 2 , . . . stand for a computable enumeration of all keys from K. The key search algorithm σ = σ (e) is as follows. Note that we have defined key search algorithm as an algorithm which calls the algorithm δ as an external subroutine; to comply formally with that definition, in the following algorithm we distinguish between running the algorithm δ (which can be done with an interpreter built into σ ) and calling the algorithm δ (as an external subroutine). The algorithm is designed in such a way that for each n, Steps (iii) and (iv) terminate (within O(n) steps) and also the loop in Steps (ii)-(iv) terminates (within O(n 2 ) steps). Therefore, the loop in Step (i) will successfully browse through all values of n = 1, 2, . . . , hence the loop in Steps (ii)-(iv) will be executed for each value of n = 1, 2, . . . . Let k be a valid key; suppose that in the enumeration considered k is k p for some p. The execution of δ(e, k ) terminates because k is valid; suppose that it terminates after q steps. Let the value of n in Step (i) be max(p, q), then one of the keys considered in Step (ii) will be k , and in Step (iii) the algorithm δ(e, k ) will run until it terminates. Therefore, in Step (iv) the algorithm δ(e, k ) will be called. This means that the algorithm σ (e) checks every valid key.
LIMITS OF THE USE OF INCOMPUTABILITY
Observation 1 shows that the incomputability of the decryption algorithm for some keys does not protect a cryptosystem against all key searches, and there definitely is an algorithm that conducts exhaustive valid key search. However, some key search algorithms are unusable in such cryptosystems: for example, as we have seen earlier, a simple exhaustive key search algorithm will not conduct exhaustive valid key search. Therefore, an interesting theoretical question is to establish exactly which key search algorithms are not likely to be successful in conducting exhaustive valid key search. This is what we shall do in this section, in Theorem 3.2. Among other things, we shall demonstrate that there are cryptosystems whose set of valid keys is not recursively enumerable, in Theorem 3.1.
Definition 3.1. We shall say that a cryptosystem (ε, δ, O, E, K) is evasive if for every key search algorithm σ and for every e ∈ E at least one of the following is true.
• There is a valid key not checked by σ (e);
• There is an invalid key checked by σ (e).
(A definition which is equivalent but which we shall not use because it is less transparent would be that a cryptosystem is evasive if its set of valid keys is not recursively enumerable.) Observation 2. Every evasive cryptosystem has infinitely many valid keys.
Proof. Suppose there are only finitely many valid keys k 1 , . . . , k n . Then it is possible to write an algorithm σ (e) consisting of a sequence of subroutine calls δ(e, k 1 ), . . . , δ(e, k n ). The algorithm σ checks all valid keys and no invalid keys. This is impossible by the definition of an evasive cryptosystem; this contradiction shows that there are infinitely many valid keys.
Observation 3. Let (ε, δ, O, E, K) be an evasive cryptosystem. Let σ be a key search algorithm, and let e ∈ E. Then at least one of the following is true.
•
There are infinitely many valid keys not checked by σ (e); • There are infinitely many invalid keys checked by σ (e).
Proof. Suppose that a key search algorithm σ (e) exists which checks all valid keys except a finite set of valid keys k 1 , . . . , k m and checks only a finite set of invalid keys l 1 , . . . , l n . Let us design a new key search algorithm σ (e) represented by the following algorithm: The algorithm σ (e) is designed to check the same keys as σ (e) with the only exception that σ (e) checks k 1 , . . . , k m and does not check l 1 , . . . , l n . The only caveat is the following: if δ(e, l) does not terminate for some l = l 1 , . . . , l n then σ (e) is stuck and will not check any more keys; however σ (e) might have continued and checked some more keys. Let us show why this situation will not arise. The algorithm σ (e) checks infinitely many keys because it checks all valid keys (except a finite set), and there are infinitely many valid keys, by Observation 2; therefore, δ(e, l) terminates for each l = l 1 , . . . , l n because otherwise the execution of σ would be stuck in δ(e, l) after having checked only finitely many keys.
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The algorithm σ checks all valid keys and no invalid keys. This is impossible by the definition of an evasive cryptosystem. Therefore, the key search algorithm σ with the properties defined above does not exist. Proof. An example of an evasive cryptosystem can be designed as follows. Let open messages be all finite sequences of bits. Let keys be all programs in a specific programming language (for example, C), and let us consider a program's output as a (possibly empty) sequence of bits. Let the encryption and decryption algorithms be as follows. Let us demonstrate that this cryptosystem is evasive. A key k, by definition, is valid if the algorithm δ(e, k) terminates for each e ∈ E. The algorithm δ(e, k) is designed in such a way that it can get stuck in Step (ii) either because k does not generate any output and terminates (and then is executed again and again, in an infinite loop), or because k generates some output and then runs forever without generating any output (then the algorithm will wait indefinitely long for k to generate more output). Therefore, a key k is valid if and only if k generates at least one bit of output and either terminates or generates infinitely many bits of output. Suppose that a key search algorithm σ (e) for some e ∈ E checks all valid keys. Let us design the following algorithm k . Note that the loop in Step (i) is an infinite loop, because σ checks all valid keys, and there are infinitely many of them, by Observation 2. All steps of the algorithms k terminate, except, maybe, Step (iii), which might not terminate for some value of n. Let us assume that Step (iii) terminates for all values of n and see that this will lead us to a contradiction. In this case, the algorithm k does not terminate and generates infinitely many bits of output (a bit per a value of n). Therefore, k is a valid key. However, k is designed in such a way that for every key k n checked by σ they encrypt the n-th bit of any (sufficiently long) open message differently. Therefore, the key k does not coincide with any key checked by σ . Therefore, σ does not check all valid keys, which contradicts our assumption regarding σ .
We must conclude that for some n Step (iii) does not terminate. It can happen because k n either does not generate any output or generates fewer than n bits of output and then runs forever without generating any more output. In either case, for such a key k n and for any encrypted message e longer than n, the algorithm δ(e, k n ) will not terminate; therefore, the key k n is not valid. Therefore, σ (e) checks an invalid key k n . Proof. (⇒) Suppose that a fixed-set key search algorithm σ conducts an exhaustive valid key search for every encrypted message e ∈ E. If for some key k n = k(σ, e, n) the algorithm δ(e, k n ) had not terminated, then the attack algorithm would have been stuck in this δ(e, k n ) after browsing through only finitely many keys, and, therefore, would not have browsed through all valid keys (by Observation 2, there are infinitely many of them). From this follows that for each e ∈ E the algorithm δ(e, k) terminates for each key checked by σ (e), which means that all keys checked by σ (e) are valid. Therefore, σ checks all valid keys and no invalid keys. In an evasive cryptosystem, such a key search algorithm does not exist. Therefore, the cryptosystem (ε, δ, O, E, K) is not evasive.
(⇐) Suppose that (ε, δ, O, E, K) is not evasive, then there is a key search algorithm σ and f ∈ E such that σ (f ) checks all valid keys but no invalid keys. Let us design a key search algorithm τ which works, for e ∈ E, as follows. steps. However, this has the same meaning as Step (i) because σ (f ) does not terminate, thanks to the fact that it checks all valid keys, and there are infinitely many of them.)
The algorithm τ is designed in such a way that the set of keys that τ (e) checks is a subset of keys that σ (f ) checks, and these two sets coincide if and only if δ(e, k) terminates for each k checked by σ (f ) because otherwise τ (e) would be stuck in Step (iii) forever and would not proceed to other keys. Because σ (f ) checks only valid keys, δ(e, k) terminates for each e ∈ E and each key k checked by σ (f ), therefore, τ (e) and σ (f ) check the same keys. Because the algorithm σ (f ) checks all valid keys, the algorithm τ (e) checks all valid keys.
CONCLUSION
It would not be correct to understand our results in the sense that unbreakable cryptosystems do not exist. The concept of 'unbreakable' cryptosystem is informal, and proper study is possible only when it is given a precise mathematical meaning. As we have seen in Section 1, there are several formalizations of the concept of unbreakable cryptosystem. Some of these formalizations are wellestablished, and workable cryptosystems can be based on them.
What we have demonstrated is that one seemingly natural formalization, which interprets the word 'unbreakable' as 'incomputable' or, more precisely, 'incomputable as far as key search algorithms are concerned', is useless because cryptosystems which are 'unbreakable' in this particular sense do not exist. However, we have also demonstrated that the intuition underlying this line of thinking is not totally unjustified: we have shown that using incomputability in the design of a cryptosystem makes one class of attacks based on key search algorithms unsuccessful.
